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Just  three  short  years  ago  I  sat  in  two  meetings  in  Washington  on
issues  relating  to our  discussion  today.  The first  was  a  meeting  to  discuss
expansion  of  grain  output  to  meet  the  world  food  emergency  facing  de-
veloping  countries.  The  second  related  to  the  same  issue,  and  to how  we
might  avoid  domestic inflationary  pressures  generated  by  rising world food
price levels.  But the rains came,  and  so did the  new tube wells,  the  "green
revolution,"  and  the  common  agricultural  policy.  Thus  the  task  of  facing
the  conflicts  in our  long-run  development  policy  and  our  domestic  export
interests is upon us again.  Frankly,  I would rather worry about the present
problems  than  about  the possibility  of mass  starvation.
A BRIEF  HISTORY
Some perspective  is  needed  on  the  great threat  of  famine  in  1965-67
and the rising surplus  of grains  in 1968  and  1969. First, from  1961  on,  the
United  States  has  been  trying  to  reduce  its  excessive  stocks  of  wheat  and
feed  grains  to  manageable  levels  through  a  variety  of  programs.  In  the
early  1960's  the  Soviet  Union  had  two  poor  crops  in  three  years  and
entered  the  international  market  in  a  significant  way.  Finally,  Australia
suffered  a major  drought,  so  that when  India  had two  successive  years  of
serious  drought,  the  stage  was  set for  a  world-wide  panic  about  the  im-
pending  famine.  World  grain  prices  rose  appreciably.  The  United  States
increased  acreage  allotments  in  1966,  and  in  1967  the weather  improved
markedly  in  Australia,  Western  Europe,  and  the  USSR.  In  1968,  India
had  a  huge  increase  in  grain  ouput,  as  did Pakistan  and  the Philippines,
These  latter  increases  coincided with  a rapid  expansion of  new wheat  and
rice  varieties,  of  fertilizer  usage,  and of irrigation.  But since no  one knows
how  much  of  the  increased  output  resulted  from  these new  varieties  and
practices,  it  is  easy  to  attribute  all  of  it  to  them.  This,  together  with the
"green revolution,"  now  is producing  a  panic of the opposite  sort. Nations
heavily  dependent  on  farm  exports  are  worrying  about  markets,  and
former  importing  nations  are viewing  export  markets  as  a way  of  earning
foreign  exchange.
If,  as  most now  assume,  the  prospect  of world-wide  starvation  is  not
imminent,  we  must  look  at  the  new  policy  issues  that  face  us  in  a  world
of  increasing  grain  surpluses.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  whether  the
87U.S.  foreign aid  programs  to  increase agricultural  output in less developed
countries  may  not  conflict  with  our  interest  in  expanded  export  markets
for  U.S.  farm  products.  Like  most  important policy  issues,  this  one  does
not  have  an  apparent  Pareto-better  solution;  thus,  our  simple  economic
tools  will  not  suffice  to bring  a  solution  satisfactory  to  all.
SOME  FACTS
First, the bulk of  all our foreign  aid  goes  to a  relatively  few  countries.
About  90  percent  of  all  country  program  funds  go  to  fifteen  countries
(Table  1).  Of  these,  Brazil,  Chile,  India,  Pakistan,  Turkey,  and Vietnam
TABLE  1. FOREIGN  AID  TO  FIFTEEN  MAJOR  COUNTRIES,  FISCAL  YEARS  1961-67
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are by  far the major  recipients.  And,  within the total  foreign  aid going  to
these  countries,  economic  assistance  to  the  agricultural  sector  has  been
small.  For  instance,  in  1955  the  economic  assistance  to  agriculture
amounted  to $54 million, by  1960 it was $204  million,  and by  1969 it had
reached  almost  $800  million.  Thus,  even  today  U.S.  technical  aid  to
agriculture  is modest.
88Second,  it  should be  recognized  that the  fifteen major recipients  of our
foreign  aid  have  not been  significant  commercial  customers  for U.S.  farm
products.  Those  fifteen  countries  accounted  for  $9  billion  of  U.S.  agri-
cultural  exports  during  the  period  1961-69,  but  only  $1.2  billion were  in
commercial  sales  (Table  2).  India,  far and away  the biggest  food importer
of  this group,  accounted  for $3.4 billion  in exports  during the period with
only  $158 million in commercial  sales. Thus, to argue that the loss of these
markets  as  a result  of the agricultural revolution  is a major loss is to fail to
recognize  that these  were  major  markets  only  as  a result of  P.L. 480.  The
American  taxpayer  was the real purchaser.
Third,  the  greatest  barrier  to  higher  food  consumption  levels  in  less
developed  countries  is  the  low  income  of  the  population.  Thus,  the  key
to  higher  consumption  is  a  higher  per  capita  income  in  underdeveloped
countries-so  distributed  as  to  increase  the purchasing  power  of the  very
poorest.  The major  barrier  to these countries  becoming major commercial
markets is  their lack  of foreign  exchange  to buy more  food.
Fourth,  the  bulk  of  the  working  population  in  the  underdeveloped
countries  is  engaged  in  peasant  agriculture,  involving  large  labor  inputs,
little  capital,  and relatively  low levels  of technology.  The farms  are  small,
and  the land is  often poor and in need  of water and fertilizer.
Economists  use  a  principle  called  comparative  advantage.  Since  by
almost  any  standard,  U.S.  agriculture  is  better  organized,  is  capital  in-
tensive,  and  uses  advanced  technology,  we  should  have  a  comparative
advantage  in  the  production  of  food  and  feed grains.  Thus,  as the theory
goes,  the  good  people on  farms  in the EEC,  India,  Nigeria,  Taiwan,  etc.,
all ought to give up farming  and go to villages and cities  and produce labor
intensive  goods  to  exchange  for U.S.,  Canadian,  and  Australian  grains.
There  is,  of  course,  one  small  hitch  in  all  this.  In  most  of  the  very
poor  countries  the bulk  of the population  is  comprised  of peasant farmers.
These  economies  are  not  generating  enough  monies  to  employ  their
natural  population  increase,  let  alone  enough  to  absorb  one-half  or  more
of  their  present  population  from  farm  into  nonfarm  employment.  Thus,
mass  urban  underemployment  and unemployment  commonly  exist side  by
side  with  a  subsistence  peasant  agriculture.  Comparative  advantage  as-
sumes  alternative  opportunities,  therefore,  an  opportunity  cost  for  the
labor  used  raising  farm  products,  a  dubious  assumption  in  many  poor
agricultural  countries.  Indeed,  most realistic  estimates  project  increases  in
farm  populations  in  these countries  for  at least  a decade  or two.
TWO  ALTERNATIVES
As  a  result  of  these  realities,  the  United  States  was  faced  with  two
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continuing  to  expand  our  ouput,  shipping  it  abroad  under P.L.  480,  and
trying  to  get  food  distribution  systems  organized  that  would  reach  from
ports  of  entry to  the  vast  population  in the villages  and farms.  The other
alternative  was  to  increase  output  of  foodstuffs  in  the  less  developed
countries.
Three  major  short-run  problems were  connected  with the first alterna-
tive.  They were:  (1)  the  increasingly  heavy  cost  of  providing  ever  larger
quantities  of  grains  through  P.L.  480,  (2)  the  difficulty  of  getting  the
grains  distributed  to  remote  areas,  and  (3)  the  effects  upon  local  pro-
ducers'  incentives  and  incomes.
I am  not  certain that  careful  cost estimates  of substantially  expanding
P.L. 480 were  ever  made,  but I suspect  some were  floating  around Wash-
ington.  One  effort to get help  on these costs was  embodied in the Interna-
tional  Grains  Agreement  growing  out  of  the  Kennedy  Round,  in  which
other  developed  countries,  whether  grain deficit  or  surplus,  were  asked to
put resources  into  an  international  food program.  Even  with this  help  the
potential  burden  of  feeding  much  of  the  underdeveloped  world  would
have  fallen  upon  U.S.  taxpayers,  and it  is  not  clear  whether  they  would
have  accepted  this  burden  at higher levels.
A large  part  of  the prospective  costs in  many  countries  relates  to  the
building  of port facilities and the storage and distribution systems necessary
to  feed  these  countries  with  imported  grains.  Distribution  in  the  large
cities  is  relatively  easy,  but  most  of  the  population  lies  outside  them.  I
heard  figures  of  $8  to  $10  billion for  such  facilities  in India  alone during
the  recent  food  crisis.  This  would  have  to be  multiplied  severalfold  if we
added  many  other  countries  to  the  list.
As for  the  effects  upon  local  producers,  the  large-scale  P.L. 480 ship-
ments  necessary  to  fill  the  future  food  gaps  would  have  depressed  the in-
come  of  those  peasants  dependent  upon  food grain sales  for cash income.
The  program  would  have  retarded  rather  than  improved the  number  one
problem  in  these  countries,  that  of raising  the  real  per  capita  income  for
the  majority  of the  population.
In addition  to  the  short-run  problems,  a  major problem  over the long
run, twenty years  or more, was that even the total farm productive capacity
of  the  developed  world  would  not  be  sufficient  to  feed  the  expanding
population  without  a  substantial  expansion  in  output  within  the  under-
developed  countries  themselves.
As  a  result  of  all  these  considerations,  the  second  alternative  was
selected  as  a  basic  policy  for  our  foreign  aid,  including  food  aid.  It was
decided  that  major  emphasis  would  be put upon  improving  the output  of
91foodstuffs  in  the  underdeveloped  countries,  with  new  emphasis  upon  the
supporting  input  industries  and  infrastructure  to  move  these  countries
toward  self-sufficiency.  This  development  was  helped by the  availability  of
the  new  varieties  of wheat  and rice.
This policy  change,  plus  many  other factors,  has led to a major change
in the  situation  from  that faced  four  years  ago.  Food grain production  in
India,  Pakistan,  and  several  other  countries  has  risen  markedly,  hope-
fully  on  a  permanent  basis.  We  now  see  some  countries  that  were  im-
porting  grains  just  three  years  ago  looking  around  for  possible  export
markets  for  grain  surpluses  above  their  domestic  needs.  In  effect,  we  are
subsidizing  export  competition  with  our own  foreign  aid,  and  coming  at  a
time  when  some  of our  traditional  cash markets  are  shrinking,  this  brings
the  whole program  into question.  To  add  insult  to injury,  there  are indica-
tions that  some less developed  countries  think we should pull out  of export
markets  where  they  would like to sell their  farm products  to increase  their
foreign  exchange  earnings.
THE  CRUNCH
Three  important  questions  now  face  us:  (1)  What  should  our foreign
aid policy  be in  the  future?  (2)  What  should our commercial  export price
policy be  in  the future?  (3)  What is  the future  of U.S.  exports?
If the  question  is  whether our foreign  aid has  subsidized  an increase  in
world  food production,  I  would have to  answer,  I  hope  so,  because that  is
what  we tried to  do!  If the question  is whether  it has  hurt our commercial
markets,  I think  the  answer  is,  very  little  so  far,  and  it can  continue to be
little  if  we  follow  the correct  aid  and  commercial  export  policy.  As I  view
it,  our  aid policy  has largely  removed  the  need for an extensive  permanent
food  aid program,  but it has  had little  effect upon our commercial markets.
Historically,  we  should  remember  that  many  of  the  food  deficit  countries
today  were  major  exporters  of  food in  earlier  years,  and  even  if they  do
not return  to that status,  we  should recognize  they  never  have  been  major
commercial  export markets  for U.S.  farm products.  Thus, the  major victim
of  the  rise  in food output is  likely  to be  our P.L. 480  program,  that  tem-
porary,  fifteen  year  old  emergency  program.  Even  it  will  be  required  for
special  emergencies  and to meet  the world's  need  for some  kind of storage
and  distribution  program  to  deal  with natural  and other  catastrophes.
Future Aid Policy
Looking  to future  aid policy  it seems to  me  that we  must continue  to
support  the development  and adoption  of modern technology  in the under-
developed  countries.  But,  more  important,  we  must  move  beyond  this  to
what  are  now  called  "second  generation  problems."  These  involve  plan-
92ning  and  adjustment  in  the  agricultural  sector,  a  better  integration  of
agriculture  with  other  economic  activities  in  the  economy,  the  develop-
ment  of  improved  internal  marketing  and  distribution  systems,  and  the
other  measures  that are  needed to start the  transition from isolated peasant
economies  to modern  world  economies.  It will  involve  more U.S.  research
and  advisory  emphasis  and  less  emphasis  on  dams,  machinery,  and hard-
ware.  Accordingly  I  would  see  our  aid  programs  moving  toward  the  in-
volvement  of  more  people  and less  things  than  in  the  recent  past.  If this
occurs,  I  believe  the  potential  conflict  with  our  export  interests  will  be
reduced  rather  than  increased.
Future Commercial Export Policy
Perhaps  the  most  important  area  is  our  future  commercial  export
price  policy.  It  is  almost certain  that the  pressures  for international  price
fixing  for  world  grain  markets  will  increase,  for  now  some  of  the  under-
developed  countries  will  join those  developed  countries  pressing  for  such
arrangements.  As  before,  I  think  such  arrangements  are  unwise  and  un-
workable,  and  they  are  especially  unwise  because  they  are  unworkable.
It seems  to  me it  would be  as  equally  faulty  economically  to give  the pro-
ducers  of  the  world  the  impression  that  the  marginal  value  of  grain  to
world  consumers  is  higher  than  it  is,  as  it  was  to  use  P.L. 480  to  allow
the  poor  countries  to  believe  the  marginal  cost  of  food  grain  was  zero.
If  producers  in  poor  countries  want  to  enter  export  markets,  they  should
have  to  do  so  on  the  basis  of  their  real  comparative  advantage  in  world
markets,  and  the  same  should  hold  for producers  in  developed  countries.
If we  are  to  transfer  income  from rich  to poor  countries,  as  I believe  we
should to  the  extent politically  feasible,  then let us  transfer  it for products
or  services  that  will  be  consistent  with long-run  economic  realities  rather
than  subsidize  overinvestment  in food  grain  capacity.
A second  important  part  of  our  commercial  policy must  be  to  accept
imports  of  foreign  agricultural  products.  We  are  in  no  position  to  tell
another  country  that  its  policies  toward  our exports  are  unfair so  long  as
we  bar  imports  of  products  to  protect  our  own  producers  who  are  not
competitive  in  world markets.  This  is  especially important  if we try to help
underdeveloped  countries  move  away  from  concentrating  on  food  and
feed  grain  production  toward  labor  intensive  export  crops.  We  hardly
expect  them  to  use  our  imported  grains  if  we  refuse  to  let  them  export
crops  to  us  in which  they  have  a clear  comparative  advantage.
Long-Run  Prospects
Finally,  a  few  comments  on  our  long-run  prospects  for  commercial
exports  of farm  products.  I am not  as optimistic  as many a few  years back
-for  theirs  was  a  false  optimism  based  on  noncommercial  demand.
93Neither  am  I  as  pessimistic  as  some  now  are,  for  as  the  people  of  the
world  become wealthier  they will  upgrade  their diets from grains  to animal
products,  and the  animal  products  will require  feed grains.  This is  the  area
in which  I believe  the United States  had  and will have  a great  comparative
advantage,  and  we  should  do  everything possible  to protect and  exploit it.
This is not  going to be  easy  because the serious  food  shortage problems  of
the  past  few years  have  made  it  relatively  easy  for governments  to get by
with some  extraordinarily  uneconomic  programs.  Now  the  true  costs have
become  apparent,  and  there  will  be  a  great  scramble  to  minimize  these
costs  by  exploiting  the  export  market.  This  is  a  game  that  is  virtually
impossible  to  win. I  hope  we  do not  invest  many  of  our chips in it.
SUMMARY
In summary,  I believe  we are making too much of the potential  conflict
between  our foreign  aid programs  and  our export interests.  It appears  that
the  major  loss will  be  in P.L.  480  exports,  which  may  have  been nice  for
U.S.  producers,  but  are  a  very  expensive  way  to  maintain  producers'  in-
comes.  Our  major  competitors  for  cash  markets  continue  to  be  the  de-
veloped  countries,  not  the  poor  countries.  And,  for  a long  time  to come,
it  is  doubtful  that  most  of  the  underdeveloped  countries  can  afford  the
expensive  luxury  of competing in the  heavily subsidized  commercial export
markets.
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